Political Science
Lisa Heinzerlingt

Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation.

Stephen Breyer. Harvard, 1993. Pp x, 127.
We regulate only some, not all, of the risk that fills the
world. Any one of us might be harmed by almost anything-a rotten apple, a broken sidewalk, an untied shoelace, a splash of grapefruit juice, a dishonest lawyer (p 3).
Thus Stephen Breyer begins his provocative book on risk
regulation. Though the book does not purport to be about untied
shoelaces or broken sidewalks, but about PCBs, dioxin, asbestos,
benzene, DDT, and the like, in the end it amounts to an argument for treating PCBs like untied shoelaces, dioxin like broken
sidewalks. Justice Breyer does more than suggest that the risks
from mundane, everyday things-like mushrooms, bread, and
swimming pools-are as great or greater than the risks from
exotic chemicals. He also says that some of the reasons why we
might treat these everyday items differently-whatever the probability that they will harm us-ought to be disregarded. The
public, however, clamors for regulation of the risks it most
fears-even if these risks are not the risks that kill or injure the
most people.
Justice Breyer wants the government to concentrate on the
risks that kill the most people. To this end, he proposes that decisions about regulating risk be made by a small group of civil
servants, trained in science, economics, and administration, and
insulated from the political process. The group's mission would be
to rationalize health, safety, and environmental regulation by
targeting current regulatory resources on programs that would
save the most human lives. Breyer envisions that science-not
politics-would be the watchword of the new regime.

t Associate Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. For helpful comments, I
am grateful to Bill Banks, Bill Eskridge, Cass Sunstein, Gerry Spann, and Dr. Michael B.
Sporn of the National Cancer Institute. Martin Mitchell provided excellent research assistance.
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Breaking the Vicious Circle is lucid and forceful. Like a good
doctor, Justice Breyer approaches the patient, modern risk regulation, with deference and modesty. He is quick to remark that
he does not believe that the people who now regulate risk are
"out of control," or "wicked or foolish" (p 11). He seems sorry to
offer his grim diagnosis, and anxious to find a cure. One measure
of Breyer's acumen is the fact that the National Performance Review, led by Vice President Al Gore, has followed several of his
prescriptions in its recommendations for regulatory reform.'
In advocating more science and less politics, however, Breaking the Vicious Circle does not heed its own message. In his description of the excesses and shortcomings of current risk regulation, Justice Breyer leans heavily to one side of the vast and
complex debate on risk assessment. He expressly acknowledges
that his examples of regulation gone awry are "selective" and
"focus on extremes" (p 28), yet he fails to see the tension between
this overtly skewed perspective and his call for more science and
less politics. In recommending new regulatory programs to replace the ones he regards as failures, he does not see that the
new programs may be attacked on the same grounds as the old
ones. Thus, Justice Breyer never adequately explains why the
new programs are preferable to the old. Moreover, he does not
explain why we would want to continue spending the same
amount of money on health, safety, and environmental regulation
in the new regime as we now spend if, as he alleges, current
regulatory programs are random and excessive. Finally, Justice
Breyer's decision to ignore every regulatory goal other than saving as many human lives as possible is suffused with the nonscience that he seeks to escape. Breaking the Vicious Circle is
thus evidence against its own thesis.

See Al Gore, Report of the National Performance Review, From Red Tape to
Results: Creating a Government that Works Better & Costs Less 167-68 (US GPO, 1993)
(recommendations include interagency coordination, risk ranking, improvements in
regulatory science, and increased training for regulators); Al Gore, Accompanying Report
of the National Performance Review: Improving Regulatory Systems 56 n 8, 71 (US GPO,
1993), citing Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle.
The National Performance Review "drew heavily" on the work of the Carnegie
Commission on Science, Technology, and Government, of which Justice Breyer was a
member. Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Better Regulations: The National Performance Review's
Regulatory Reform Recommendations, 43 Duke L J 1165, 1168-69 (1994). See generally
Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology, and Government, Risk and the Environment: ImprovingRegulatory Decision Making (1993).
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I. REGULATION AND ITS REFORM

Like much of Justice Breyer's scholarship, Breaking the Vicious Circle is both critical and positive.2 In the first of three
parts, Breyer identifies problems with current regulation of small
or uncertain risks. The second part of the book describes a "Vicious circle" in which ill-informed public perceptions of risk, legislative responses to those perceptions, and agencies' reliance on
uncertain science cause the problems he has identified. In the
final section, Justice Breyer offers a solution: he proposes that
decisions about small or uncertain health risks be made by an
elite group of civil servants located in the executive branch.
A. Problems
1. Tunnel vision.
Justice Breyer identifies three problems with current regulation of small or uncertain risks to human health: it is often excessive, random, and inconsistent. The first problem Breyer sees
in the way we regulate risk is what he calls "tunnel vision," or
"the last 10 percent" (p 10):
Tunnel vision, a classic administrative disease, arises when
an agency so organizes or subdivides its tasks that each
employee's individual conscientious performance effectively
carries single-minded pursuit of a single goal too far, to the
point where it brings about more harm than good (p 11).
When substances pose serious health risks through long exposures to high doses, Justice Breyer says, the regulating agency
often does not stop at the long-exposure, high-dose case, but
continues to regulate "to remove the last little bit" or "the last 10
percent"-which carries regulation long past the point at which
the benefits of cleanup surpass its costs (p 11).
Substances that have been overregulated include, in Breyer's
view, asbestos (pp 12-14), benzene (pp 14-15), dioxin (pp 16-17,
96 n 100), and PCBs (p 17). Regulatory programs illustrating the
problem of "the last 10 percent" include the ban on EDB (a grain
fumigant) (p 17), the ban on land disposal of hazardous waste (p

The most prominent example is Stephen Breyer, Regulation and Its Reform (Harvard, 1982). See also Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting
Statutes, 65 S Cal L Rev 845 (1992); Stephen Breyer, The Legislative Veto After Chadha,
72 Georgetown L J 785 (1984).
2

The University of Chicago Law Review

[62:449

17), the drinking water standard for polynuclear aromatic hydrocarbons (a pollutant) (pp 17-18), EPA's standard for uranium mill
tailings (p 18), and, it appears, the entire Superfund program (p
18). From these examples, Breyer concludes that there is "a significant 'last 10 percent' problem" (p 18).
Justice Breyer targets these programs for at least two reasons. First, he criticizes them for requiring vast expenditures to
save a single human life. For example, he refers approvingly to a
Fifth Circuit decision, Corrosion Proof Fittings v EPA,3 which
overturned EPA's ban on all asbestos products (p 14). The Corrosion ProofFittings court estimated that, in a handful of discrete
industries, the ban would cost $200-300 million per life saved,
and it decided that this was too much to spend.4 Breyer does not
identify the exact point at which the cost of saving a life exceeds
its benefits-he does not say how much he believes a human life
is worth. However, he does suggest that $3 million is a reasonable amount to spend to save a life (p 15), that $180 million is
too much (p 15), and that $2-10 million might be "a rough outer
bound limit of sensible expenditures" (pp 99-100 n 122).
To the predictable objection that it is impossible to value a
human life, Justice Breyer responds that we do it all the time:
[Elvery day, each of us implicitly evaluates risks to life. We
begin to run risks to achieve our daily objectives the instant
we get out of bed. We find it worth spending money on an
ordinary fire alarm system, but not worth installing state-ofthe-art automatic-phone-dialing fire protection. We believe it
worth installing guard rails on bridges, but not worth coating the Grand Canyon in soft plastic to catch those who
might fall over the edge (p 16).
A second way Breyer identifies overregulation is to compare
the risks posed by regulated substances with those posed by
things we might use or consume every day. For example, he
writes:
How dangerous are the fearsome-sounding PCBs? We know
that exposure to high concentrations causes rashes in humans and tumors in test animals. But should EPA have set
a standard for transformers leaking PCB-laden mineral oil
so low as to require the expenditure of $140 million to avoid

'

947 F2d 1201 (5th Cir 1991).

4 Id at 1223.
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health risks considerably lower than those accompanying
eating a raw mushroom? How broadly should regulatory
agencies have swept with their ban of EDB, a grain fumigant which under most circumstances poses risks roughly
equivalent to those posed by the chloroform in chlorine to
the child who spends an hour in a swimming pool? (p 17)
Justice Breyer frequently invokes this type of comparison. For
example, like the Fifth Circuit in CorrosionProofFittings,Breyer
says that toothpicks kill more people than certain asbestos products (p 14).' And, in the opening pages of the book, he offers a
chart translating the statistical risk of dying from various activities and events into the risk of death from smoking a certain
number of cigarettes in a lifetime (p 5 fig 1). For the risk of dying
in an auto accident (21/100,000 people each year), the "cigarette
equivalency" is 422 (p 5 fig 1). Justice Breyer's chart illustrates
the fact that many of the risks at issue in his study are risks
lower than 25/100,000-or, he contends, lower than the risk of
dying associated with smoking slightly more than 20 packs of
cigarettes in a lifetime (p 6).
Breyer acknowledges that people value the same numerical
risks-that is, the same statistical probability of death or injury--differently depending on the nature and context of the danger. Thus, people might fear the risk of getting cancer from asbestos differently from the risk of dying in a car accident (p 16).
Nevertheless, Justice Breyer says, "if you think it is reasonable
to spend more money to save a life when asbestos is at issue, you
must, at least, ask yourself how much more, and you should try
to explain to yourself why" (p 16). Breyer estimates, for example,
that removing asbestos from public buildings may cost about
$250 million per life saved over 40 years (p 13). Translated to the
context of auto safety, Breyer says that this would be equivalent
to spending about $48,000 extra for a slightly safer car (pp 1314). He doubts that "value differences" between the contexts of
asbestos and auto safety account for the difference in what we
spend to save a single life in each context (p 16).
Breyer is worried about the problem of "the last 10 percent"
because "the resources available to combat health risks are not
limitless" (p 18). Citing estimates of the costs of cleaning up toxic
and nuclear waste sites that run into the hundreds of billions of
dollars (pp 18-19), Breyer concludes that "[t]he money is not, or

6

Id at 1223 n 23.
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will not be, there to spend, at least not if we want to address
more serious environmental or social problems

. .

." (p 19). Rath-

er than spending money on "the last 10 percent," Justice Breyer
recommends spending it on prenatal care, vaccinations, and
mammograms (p 19), because he believes this ultimately would
save more human lives.
2. Random agenda selection.
A second problem in risk regulation-what Justice Breyer
calls "random agenda selection" (p. 19)-is related to the first.
While the government is expending many resources chasing "the
last 10 percent," it is, in Breyer's view, ignoring many other,
more serious risks. Few chemicals are adequately tested, much
less regulated (pp 19-20). Moreover, regulators focus predominantly (sometimes exclusively) on risks from cancer while paying
scant attention to other kinds of health risks, such as neurotoxicity (p 20). Perhaps not surprisingly, a ranking of significant
health risks by EPA experts, listed in EPA's 1987 study, Unfinished Business,6 departed considerably from the Agency's actual
regulatory priorities (p 20). Risks that the experts ranked as relatively low-such as hazardous waste cleanup-had a high priority among the regulatory agencies, while risks that they ranked
as more significant, such as indoor pollution, had relatively low
priority (p 20). Ultimately, Breyer laments the lack of rational
prioritization of risk regulation: "one cannot find any detailed
federal governmental list that prioritizes health or safety risk
problems so as to create a rational, overall agenda-an agenda
that would seek to maximize attainable safety or to minimize
health-related harms" (p 20).
3. Inconsistency.
The lack of an overarching regulatory plan to prioritize
health risks may contribute to the third problem Justice Breyer
sees in current risk regulation--"inconsistency" (p 21). Not only
do agencies have different ways of calculating how many lives
will be saved by a regulatory measure (p 21), but they also spend
widely differing amounts to save a single life. Breyer cites a 1992
study by the Office of Management and Budget ("OMB") showing
a cost range of $100,000 to $5.7 trillion per life saved by various
6

Environmental Protection Agency, Unfinished Business:A ComparativeAssessment

of Environmental Problems (1987).
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regulations (pp 22, 24-27 table 5).' In comparison, he says, labor
unions bargaining about safety rules "will insist upon rules that
value statistical lives saved at around $5-6 million" (p 22). Justice Breyer contends that we could save more lives by "refocusing" our regulatory resources (p 22).
Breyer believes, moreover, that a good deal of regulation is
counterproductive because it actually increases health risks. He
cites examples ranging from regulation of zinc in drinking water
(which, he says, will increase the cost of zinc ointment used with
regular diapers and thus encourage the use of disposable diapers,
thereby filling more landfill space) (pp 22, 97-98 n 112) to automobile fuel consumption standards (which, he suggests, "may
have cost hundreds of lives per year" by encouraging smaller, less
crash-resistant cars) (p 22). He also joins the "richer is safer"
crowd by suggesting that regulation costing more than $7.25
million per life saved will itself, "under certain assumptions," kill
one person due to adverse health effects from decreased income
(p 23). It is partly on the basis of studies linking increased regulation with decreased health that Breyer suggests that $2-10
million may be a "rough outer bound limit of sensible expenditures" to save a human life (pp 99-100 n 122).
In short, Justice Breyer believes that regulation of small or
uncertain risks to human health is too often excessive, random,
and inconsistent. Although he labels only the first "tunnel vision," each of these problems might be said to stem from an unduly limited perspective: excessiveness, from a failure to see
when the continued pursuit of a worthy goal becomes unproductive; randomness, from a failure to step back and view the whole
picture, including more serious problems than the ones currently
in view; and inconsistency, from a failure to appreciate the full
consequences of regulatory actions.
B. Causes
Justice Breyer offers a three-part explanation for the causes
of the overly narrow perspective of risk regulation. Ill-informed
public perceptions of risk, congressional responses to those
misperceptions, and agencies' reliance on unreliable science comprise Breyer's vicious circle.

' For these figures, Breyer cites Office of Management and Budget, Regulatory
Programof the United States Government April 1, 1991-March 31, 1992 12 table 2 (US
GPO, 1992).
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1. Public fears.
Ordinary citizens do not view "risk" in the same way that
experts on risk assessment do. For example, laypeople rank nuclear power near the top of their list of the riskiest activities;
experts rank it near the bottom (p 33). This divergence in the
views of experts and lay citizens is the first part of the "vicious
circle" that Justice Breyer wishes to break.
Breyer notes one common explanation for this divergence. In
assessing riskiness, experts tend to look only at how many people
are likely to be killed or injured. Laypeople, in contrast, tend also
to care about whether the risk is voluntary or involuntary, concentrated or diffuse, familiar or unfamiliar, harmful to future
generations or only to the present one (p 33).'
Justice Breyer doubts, however, that these differences fully
explain the divergence between the public's and experts' rankings
of risks. "Not many of us," he says, "would like to shift resources
to increase overall risks of death significantly in order to increase
the likelihood that death will occur on a bicycle or in a fire, rather than through disease" (p 35). Instead, he suggests, the public
simply "does not believe that the risks are tiny" (p 35).
Other aspects of risk perception compound the likelihood
that public reaction to risk will be, in Breyer's view, irrational.
He believes that laypeople oversimplify, notice prominent events
more than mundane ones (even if mundane events harm more
people), feel a stronger duty to the people around them than to
those at a distance, do not trust experts, are reluctant to change
their minds, and do not understand the mathematics of risk
assessment (pp 35-36). These things might help explain why
people fear nuclear power plants more than coal-fired ones, even
if the latter have so far killed more people than the former (p
38).9
Justice Breyer does not believe that better "risk communication" is the answer. He observes that efforts to improve public
understanding of risks have sometimes backfired (pp 38-39), and
holds out little hope for improvement over time (p 39). "It is
8

See also Paul Slovic, Perceptionof Risk, 236 Science 280 (Apr 17, 1987); Clayton P.

Gillette and James E. Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U Pa L Rev 1027 (1990);
Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative Critique of Comparative Risk Analysis, 92 Colum L Rev 562 (1992).
9 Justice Breyer has argued that it makes no sense to regulate nuclear power more
severely than coal power on the basis of health risks, because the coal industry has killed
more people than the nuclear industry. Stephen Breyer, Vermont Yankee and the Courts'
Role in the Nuclear Energy Controversy, 91 Harv L Rev 1833, 1835-36, 1845 (1978).
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hard," he sighs, "to make the normal human mind grapple with
this inhuman type of problem" (p 39).
2. Congressional response.
Congress forges the second piece of Breyer's vicious circle by
responding to the public's misperceptions of risk through "detailed statutory instructions" (p 39). Some of these instructions-such as the Delaney Clause, forbidding food additives to
contain any amount, however small, of a human carcinogen-simply demand too much safety from the start (p 41). Other
statutory instructions may establish a regulatory agenda without
any "reasonable policy goal," thereby amounting, in Breyer's
view, to "a set of shots in the dark" (p 41).
Congress is not good at writing detailed regulatory statutes
that are effective, Justice Breyer says, because it lacks a unified,
objective perspective from which to consider candidates for regulation (p 42). Moreover, "Congress is highly responsive to public
opinion, as it ought to be. This means, however, that if the public
finds it difficult to order risk priorities, Congress is also likely to
find it difficult to write an effective agency agenda for addressing
risk" (p 42). Thus, rather than translating the public's
misperceptions of risk into a coherent policy, Congress may instead exacerbate the problem by overreacting to the public's perception of risk.
3. Agency assumptions.
The circle is closed by the administrative agencies. Because
regulation of risks to human health occurs in an atmosphere of
profound scientific uncertainty, regulators must make many
assumptions in assessing health risks. They usually assume, for
example, a linear relationship between "dose" and effect. They
assume that there is no threshold of exposure below which a substance is entirely safe. They assume a lifetime of exposure to the
substance in question. They mostly study effects on animals
rather than humans. In reporting their results, they tend to
emphasize the upper bound-that is, the highest plausible risk
(pp 43-47).
Justice Breyer inveighs against all of these practices (pp 4347). He believes that in many cases regulators will, by relying on
these practices, significantly overestimate actual risk (pp 44-45,
47); indeed, he approvingly cites an OMB estimate that the assumptions commonly used in risk assessments "'often' overstate
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risks by factors of a thousand or even a million or more" (p 47).
Yet he acknowledges that, in other cases, these assumptions may
greatly underestimate risk because they ignore, among other
things, synergistic effects among substances (p 47).
Moreover, Breyer says, "[tihe very fact that the many assumptions required by uncertainties are not clearly derivable
from science can make them a lightning rod for contending political forces" (p 49). In other words, when an agency's choice of
assumptions appears subjective and political rather than objective and scientific, it encourages the public to get involved in the
decision-making process-and thus the vicious circle begins again
(p 50).
C. Solutions
Justice Breyer believes that the solution to the problems he
identifies is to spend the same amount we now spend on health
and safety regulation-but to spend it differently (p 67). He believes that the way to achieve this result is to lodge the power to
make decisions about health risks in a small, elite cadre of civil
servants located in the executive branch. The advantage of this
new institutional arrangement, Breyer says, is that it would
capitalize on the "virtues of bureaucracy"-rationalization, expertise, insulation, and authority (pp 61-63).
The new group's mission would be rationalization of our riskregulating system (p 60). One of its tasks would be to develop a
coherent and rational methodology for assessing health risks.
Breyer envisions the development of a system that, like the costof-service rate making found in the utility industry, "solves
roughly similar problems in roughly similar ways irrespective of
the particular regulatory program or regulated industry at issue"
(p 62). The new group might, he says, "develop models that aim
to achieve higher-quality analysis and better results"--such as
"dose extrapolation models with thresholds" (p 66).
The new group might also develop standards to ensure that
the substantive results of risk regulation are consistent and rational. It could, for example, identify a "de minimis level of risk
below which any program ought to consider a substance safe,"
and likewise identify a "level of expenditure beyond which a
program should not go in its efforts to save a single statistical
life" (p 65). Moreover, it could create a "risk agenda" that would
set priorities within and among programs, and seek "tradeoffs
among programs that will lead overall to improved health or
safety" (p 67). As an illustration, Breyer suggests that some
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Superfund cases might be settled, and the funds used "to help
pay for vaccinations, or prenatal care, or mammograms" (p 67).
In addition, the group might exploit gains in scientific knowledge. If, for example, we eventually are able to identify those who
are genetically predisposed to cancer, maybe we could-rather
than limit use of the chemicals that put them at risk----provide
them with special counseling that includes information about
how to avoid exposure to the carcinogens to which they are particularly susceptible" (p 67).
Justice Breyer believes that, to succeed in its risk-regulating
mission, this new group must have certain characteristics. First,
it must have interagency jurisdiction-giving it the power to
transfer resources, for example, "from toxic waste to vaccination
or prenatal care" (p 60). Second, it must have prestige, so that it
can attract an expert and capable staff trained in science, economics, and administration (p 61). Third, it must be politically
insulated-which may be achieved both through civil service
protection and through reference to the "coherent, well-workedout system" that is part of its mission to develop (pp 61, 62-63).
Finally, the group must have what Justice Breyer calls "authority," by which he means something more than legal jurisdiction. He means public confidence (p 63). He expects that "technically better results" will enhance the legitimacy of the new
group's regulatory decisions and, thus, perhaps justify giving the
group even greater responsibilities (p 63). He hopes, in short,
that more effective regulation of health risks will create a "politics of trust" (p 81).

II. TUNNEL VISION
Even the most ardent environmentalist must be fazed by
Breyer's depressing list of costly and counterproductive regulations. From Breyer's perspective, risk regulation in this country
alternately appears an embarrassing extravagance-like goldplating a lawn mower-or a roundabout and expensive way of
killing people.
Are things as bad as Justice Breyer says? It depends.
It depends, first of all, on whom one listens to. Justice Breyer
is nothing if not a thorough documentarian, and he supports
most of his factual claims by reference to some expert's views or
study's conclusions. The rub is, one might also oppose many of
his claims by citing different experts or studies.
In characterizing the risks posed by various chemicals and
other substances, and in criticizing the methods now used to as-
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sess those risks, Breyer leans hard to one side of the scientific
literature. Two specific claims deserve special attention, as they
bear directly on his proposals for reform. The first is his claim
that linear dose-response curves and animal studies are inadequate bases for assessing risks to humans, along with his related
assertion that transferring decisions about risk to an elite corps
of civil servants is a way to address this matter (pp 44-46, 59-61).
If one listened to the experts found in the "but sees" and "but cfs"
in Justice Breyer's endnotes, however, one would hear that linear
dose-response curves may sometimes understate cancer risks (p
110 n 73), and that virtually all of the substances known to cause
cancer in humans have also been shown to cause cancer in rodents (p 109 n 60).
Moreover, Breyer's notion that if we would just cut the public
and its elected representatives out of the process of risk regulation, we would somehow solve the problems posed by scientific
uncertainty fails to appreciate the nonpolitical origins of scientific
uncertainty. Breyer hopes, for example, that the creation of an
elite and insulated group of civil servants will lead to the development of dose-extrapolation models with thresholds (p 66). But
the limits of science, not of politics, have so far prevented us from
developing such models. Thus, although Breyer condemns the use
of animal tests and linear, no-threshold dose-response curves in
assessing risks to humans, he has nothing but wishful thinking
to offer in their place."
To use Breyer's own terminology, then, there is a "mismatch"
between his description of the problem and his proposal for reform. 1 There is scant reason to believe that the creation of a
new group of bureaucrats will solve the dilemma posed by scientific uncertainty-unless the solution is to cease regulating in the
face of uncertainty. In this regard, one can only marvel at
Breyer's simultaneous advocacy of more and better risk assessment and his criticism of some programs for regulating too little
(pp 19-20), when such programs have stalled precisely because
they call for the kind of risk assessment Justice Breyer has in mind.'
"0 Bruce Ames's campaign against using rodent tests to assess human cancer risks
has been criticized on similar grounds. See Peter F. Infante, Prevention Versus
Chemophobia: a defence of rodent carcinogenicitytests, 337 Lancet 538, 540 (1991) (arguing that epidemiological studies on humans are inferior substitutes for animal studies
because they take place after the fact, exposure data are often lacking, and cancer's long
latency period means high administrative costs and lengthy exposures during the testing
period).
Breyer, Regulation and Its Reform at 191 (cited in note 2).
See Oliver Houck, Risk Management: Gone Too Far?, Envir F 8, 9-10 (Mar-Apr
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A second aspect of Breyer's discussion of the scientific literature also merits special attention. Breyer's book is, perhaps most
of all, a call for better prioritization in risk regulation, and much
of the persuasive force of this plea derives from Breyer's comparisons between everyday risks, such as those posed by mushrooms,
and the risks posed by exotic chemicals, such as PCBs. These
comparisons are based on the so-called "HERP" index, developed
by scientists Bruce Ames, Renae Magaw, and Lois Gold. 3 This
index compares the relative carcinogenic risks to humans of various substances. It expresses carcinogenic risks as the ratio of
estimated human exposures ("Human Exposure dose") to the
daily dose rate of the substance required to halve the percentage
of tumor-free rodents (or, the dose that causes cancer in half of
the animals studied) ("Rodent Potency dose").
Ames, Magaw, and Gold's article introducing the HERP
index made a splash in the popular press largely because, based
on this index, they contended that the risks we face from mushrooms, celery, peanut butter, figs, potatoes, coffee, tea, and alfalfa
sprouts were on a par with those we face from PCBs, dioxin,
benzene, and synthetic pesticides. Although Justice Breyer cites
such comparisons without qualification, in fact the HERP index
raises many questions.
For one thing, the index, like the risk analyses that Justice
Breyer elsewhere criticizes (p 47), looks at risk one substance at
a time. Thus, it ignores the possible cumulative effects of background exposures to naturally occurring carcinogens and increased exposure to "nonsynthetic" carcinogens (such as asbestos)
and to synthetic carcinogens.' 4 In addition, Ames, Magaw, and
Gold assume that we have comparable defenses against synthetic
chemicals such as PCBs and dioxin, and against naturally occur- ring carcinogens such as those found in mushrooms, potatoes,
and alfalfa sprouts." But this may not be so."6 Moreover, foods
1994), reviewing Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle (arguing that successful health and
environmental laws have been those that do not rely on risk assessment, and unsuccessful
ones have been those that do).
"' Bruce N. Ames, Renae Magaw, and Lois Swirsky Gold, Ranking Possible Carcinogenic Hazards, 236 Science 271, 273 table 1 (Apr 17, 1987). For a sampling of accounts in
the popular press, see Harold Gilliam, Mother Nature's Own Carcinogens, SF Chron 10
(June 2, 1991); Kathleen McAuliffe, Life's Hazards:Are pesticidesthe problem, US News &
World Rep 72 (Nov 16, 1987); New Scale Calculates Various Cancer Risks, Chi Trib 18
(Apr 18, 1987); Jane E. Brody, New Index Finds Some CancerDangersAre Overratedand
Others Ignored, NY Times A10 (Apr 17, 1987).
14 See Samuel S. Epstein and Joel B. Swartz, CarcinogenicRisk Estimation, 240 Science 1043, 1044 (May 20, 1988).
15 See generally Ames, Magaw and Gold, 236 Science at 271 (cited in note 13).
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containing naturally occurring carcinogens, such as fruits and
vegetables, also often contain substances that may prevent cancer. 7 No similar case has been made for the beneficial properties of PCBs, dioxin, and benzene.
Furthermore, several of the exposure levels assumed for
synthetic chemicals in the HERP index embody the effects of
regulation; these levels, and their concomitant risk, would be
much higher without regulation. It is also worth mentioning that
the "Rodent Potency dose" used to derive the HERP index is, as
the name suggests, based on animal tests-the kind of tests that
Ames (and Justice Breyer) have severely criticized.'8 Indeed,
Ames, Magaw, and Gold take pains to stress that the HERP
index is not a measure of actual risk to humans."
Justice Breyer mentions none of this when he compares the
risks of PCBs to mushrooms, and EDB to swimming pools. Nor
does he note that his "cigarette equivalency" figures are based on
the same linear dose-extrapolation models that he elsewhere condemns.
These are not the only examples of Breyer's tendency to lean
to one side of the scientific debate. Other experts cited as contrary authority in Breyer's endnotes would, for example, tell us
that cancer deaths and cancer rates are rising, and that environmental factors may be to blame (p 86 n 9),20 and they would
contest Breyer's figures on the number of cancer deaths attributable to occupational and environmental exposures (pp 85-86 n 6).
Moreover, experts not cited by Breyer would tell us that richer
people may be healthier because of the same things that made
them rich, and not because they are rich,2 ' and that cancer dominates the scientific research agenda, not just because of the
public's fear of it, but also because it is more susceptible to quantitative risk assessment than many other serious human health risks.
18

See I. Bernard Weinstein, Mitogenesis Is Only One Factor in Carcinogenesis,251

Science 387, 388 (Jan 25, 1991).
17 See Lois Swirsky Gold, et al, Rodent Carcinogens: Setting Priorities,258 Science
261, 264 (Oct 9, 1992).
18 See Weinstein, 251 Science at 388); Epstein and Swartz, 240 Science at 1043 (cited

in note 14).
9 See Ames, Magaw, and Gold, 236 Science at 272, 275 (cited in note 13).
Devra Lee Davis, Gregg E. Dinse, and David G. Hoel, Decreasing Cardiovascular
Disease and Increasing CancerAmong Whites in the United States From 1973 Through
1987, 271 JAMA 431, 437 (1994).
2 See C.P. Wen, S.P. Tsai, and R.L. Gibson, Anatomy of the Healthy Worker Effect. A
CriticalReview, 25 J Occupational Med 283 (1983).
2 See Robert V. Percival, et al, Environmental Regulation:Law, Science, and Policy
508 (Little, Brown, 1992).
'0
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Finally, experts other than the ones on whom Justice Breyer
relies would give us a very different estimate of the costs and
benefits of regulation. While Justice Breyer trivializes the risks
posed by synthetic chemicals by leaning to one side of the scientific debate, he almost certainly exaggerates the costs of controlling these chemicals by uncritically accepting the notoriously
inflated cost estimates of industry and the Reagan-Bush OMB.'
By reporting OMB estimates of cost as fact, while discounting
EPA's estimates of risk, Breyer makes the spread between costs
and benefits look unrealistically large.
Thus, based on the research of a different set of experts, one
might paint a picture of risk regulation very different from the
one sketched by Breyer. Whether the current state of risk regulation is as bad as Breyer claims depends also on how one characterizes the costs and benefits of regulation. One might develop a
more sympathetic account of risk regulation than does Breyer if
one took a larger set of interests into account. Perhaps most
important, a large part of the aim of the programs Breyer criticizes is to protect living things other than human beings. Yet, in
all of Breyer's book, nary a reference to a tree, a bird, a flower, or
a single living thing other than a human being appears. By ignoring all regulatory purposes other than saving human lives,
Breyer underestimates the benefits that flow from the regulations
he describes.
An example may show how Breyer skews his arguments by
considering only a limited set of interests. Breyer says that EPA's
ban on asbestos pipes, shingles, coating, and paper would have
cost $200-300 million to save 7-8 lives over thirteen years (p 14).
Turning to EPA's explanation of its rule, however, one discovers
that the estimated total cost of the ban was approximately $460
million, and that EPA thought the ban would prevent at least
202 cancer deaths over thirteen years, and might prevent ten to
twenty times that many.' This is not to mention the people
whose lives would have been saved after the thirteen-year period
EPA studied, nor those whom EPA expected, in the absence of

' See, for example, William G. Rosenberg, Clean Air Act Amendments, 251 Science
1546, 1547 (Mar 29, 1991) (actual cost of lead phaseout was 95 percent less than oil

industry estimates); EPA's Asbestos Regulations: Report on a Case Study on OMB Interference in Agency Rulemaking, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the
House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong, 1st Sess 76-87 (1985) (criticizing

OMB cost-benefit analysis).
2
Environmental Protection Agency, Asbestos; Manufacture, Importation, Processing,
and Distribution in Commerce Prohibitions, 54 Fed Reg 29460, 29467-68 (1989).
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the ban, to die from asbestosis rather than cancer. Moreover, the
asbestos ban prevented nonfatal illnesses in human beings as
well as harms to other living things. Taken together, these
figures mean that the ban would have cost $460 million to prevent between 200 and 4,000 cancer deaths, plus preventing harm
to other living things, nonfatal illnesses in humans, and
noncancer deaths. This amounts to no more than about $2.3
million per life saved, and may amount to a good deal less. Put
another way, the asbestos ban would have cost each American
about fourteen cents a year to prevent all these harms.' Described this way, one might conclude that the asbestos ban was a
bargain.
This example shows how, by truncating the set of interests
one considers in tallying the benefits of regulation, one can swing
the cost-benefit calculation against regulation. It also shows how,
by describing the very same costs and benefits in a different way
(fourteen cents per citizen, rather than $300 million in a handful
of industries), one can make the cost-benefit calculation look
much more favorable to regulation. Justice Breyer makes some
current risk regulation look outlandish partly by considering only
a limited set of benefits (avoided human deaths from cancer over
a limited number of years), and partly by describing the costs as
extremely concentrated. If one described the benefits in the same
concentrated way-for example, by thinking of the benefits of
saving one's own life, or the life of a loved one, rather than the
benefits of saving a faceless, nameless "statistical ife"-their
value would grow dramatically.
Justice Breyer also skews his account of the current state of
risk regulation by myopically accounting for the causes of ineffective regulation. Nowhere does Breyer admit the possibility that
regulated industries have played any part in creating the problems he describes. 6 To criticize the government for not spending
enough on climate change (p 20), or for spending too much litigating Superfund cases (p 18), without mentioning industry's
history of fighting regulation every step of the way, is to provide
a woefully incomplete account of what ails environmental policy
in this country.27
2
The fourteen-cent figure is derived by dividing $460 million by thirteen (to reflect
the number of years in EPA's study), and dividing this by our approximate population
(250 million).
' For another perspective, see Robert B. Reich, Tales of a New America 212-21
(Times Books, 1987); Robert B. Reich, The Regulation Wars, Bus Monthly 61 (Mar 1988).
2 Compare David A. Dana, Setting Environmental Priorities: The Promise of a
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Nor does Breyer lose any sleep over underzealous regulators.
Indeed, part of his purpose is to liberate regulators from the
specific directives and explicit deadlines that Congress quite
often includes in environmental legislation (p 41)Y Oddly,
Breyer suggests that such specificity may result from Congress's
"wish to indicate clearly that it is responsible for publicly desired
strict regulation, whose ultimate costs, from a political perspective, may be less visible" (p 42). But if Congress has this cynical perspective, the better idea would be for it to draft exceedingly general, not specific, statutory commands, so that it could give the
impression of worrying about environmental risks without fearing that something will actually be done about them. Indeed,
some critics contend that this is just what Congress has often
done.'
In sum, Breyer's pessimistic account of the state of current
risk regulation-its problems, its costs and benefits, and the
causes of its shortcomings-reflects a kind of tunnel vision. And
it is a tunnel vision that tends to work in only one direction-against regulation. If one wants more science and less
politics, therefore, one would do well to look beyond the pages of
Breyer's book.
To be sure, Justice Breyer does occasionally remind the reader that his claims are controversial. Indeed, he acknowledges
that his examples of regulatory problems "are selective; they
focus on extremes. They leave out the far more numerous examples of balanced, sensible, and cost-effective regulations" (p 28).
But this just leaves one wondering why he decided to be "selective" and "focus on extremes," and why he chose to list to the side
that sees less risk rather than to the side that sees more. This
skewed perspective detracts from the credibility of his critique of
current regulation and invites the same charge of sensationalism
that Breyer has levelled against the public and the press (pp 3536, 37-38)."o It also threatens his own recommendations for reBureaucratic Solution, 74 BU L Rev 365, 376-81 (1994), reviewing Breyer, Breaking the
Vicious Circle (criticizing Breyer's failure to account for the influence of interest groups
and warning of the danger of "uneven depoliticization," in which the public, but not
industry, is cut out of Breyer's new decision-making process).
' For an argument that Congress is already moving in the direction Breyer proposes
for risk regulation, see Craig Gannett, Congressand the Reform of Risk Regulation, 107
Harv L Rev 2095 (1994).
29 David Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility: How Congress Abuses the People
Through Delegation (Yale, 1993); David Schoenbrod, Goals Statutes or Rules Statutes: The
Case of the CleanAir Act, 30 UCLA L Rev 740, 751-56 (1983); John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 Ecol L Q 233 (1990).
' In criticizing the press, Justice Breyer describes sensationalism only in one direc-
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form. The points Breyer raises against current programs may be
turned against the very programs that he urges us to adopt-and
thus make it possible to argue that there should be no regulation
at all.
HI. RANDOM AGENDA SELECTION
Despite his severe criticisms of risk regulation, Justice
Breyer calls deregulation a "non-solution" for the problems he
identifies (p 56). Rather than entirely foregoing government action, he wants us to spend the same amount of money we now
spend on health, safety, and environmental regulation-but to
spend it differently (pp 67, 76)."' His recurring suggestion is
that we divert money now spent on hazardous waste cleanups to
vaccinations, prenatal care, or mammograms (pp 19, 67). Other
candidates for the reallocated resources include, for example, programs to abate indoor smoke and pollution (p 23); programs encouraging and subsidizing healthier diets (pp 23, 28); and programs attending to "more serious ecological problems, such as
ozone, forest destruction, or climate change" (p 28). Yet many of
the arguments Breyer makes with respect to current regulatory
programs may also be raised against his proposed programs.
Breyer's suggestion to divert money toward the "more serious
ecological problems" of ozone, forest destruction, and climate
change poses the biggest puzzle. He offers no hint of the profound
uncertainties associated with these problems. Many experts contend that our preoccupation with climate change, for example, is
just another example of the kind of overreaction that Breyer

tion. For example, he criticizes the press for its unduly excited accounts of the risks from
toxic waste dumps (p 38), but does not mention the press's equally agitated accounts of
overregulation of the same waste sites. See, for example, Peter Passell, Experts Question

Staggering Costs of Toxic Cleanups: A New View of the Perils, NY Times Al (Sept 1,
1991); Paul Craig Roberts, Even 'Deep Pockets' Can Be Emptied: Overregulation and new
superfund liabilities are sending insurers the way of the S&Ls, LA Times B7 (Sept 26,
1991) (op-ed); Richard L. Stroup, Newly Vulnerable to Superfund's Claws, Wall St J A10
(Jan 4, 1994).
" In hearings before the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, in
which he presented his views on risk regulation, Breyer testified that he "certainly would
not want to see [the nation's commitment to the environment] reduced in any way whatsoever, taking that commitment in terms of resources .... " Use of Risk Analysis and
Cost-Benefit Analysis in Setting Environmental Priorities, Hearings before the Senate
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, 103 Cong, 1st Sess 22 (Nov 9, 1993). Breyer
testified to similar effect at his confirmation hearings. See Confirmation Hearings for
Stephen G. Breyer, to be an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court, Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 103d Cong, 2d Sess 39 (July 14, 1994) (Miller Reporting
transcript).
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elsewhere perceives and condemns. 2 Moreover, a panel convened by the National Academy of Sciences recommended adaptation to, in addition to prevention of, climate change.' Since
Breyer describes a similar kind of strategy for protecting people
who are at special risk of developing cancer (p 67), it is not clear
why he appears to take a different tack when it comes to climate
change (p 22)."4
Similarly, studies showing a link between indoor air pollution (including second-hand smoke and radon) and cancer are
subject to the same kinds of criticisms Breyer has raised against
risk assessment generally. Indeed, they used the same basic
methodology that elsewhere he wants us to discard." In the
end, then, it is not clear why Justice Breyer uncritically accepts
measures responding to these threats as more protective of human life than the measures undertaken by the current risk regulating system.
Even mammograms and vaccinations present more questions
than Justice Breyer acknowledges. Vaccination programs, for
example, are notorious for their "risk/risk" tradeoffs. Recall the
disastrous swine flu vaccine, and the intense debate over the
safety of the whooping cough3s and polio vaccines." Likewise,
' The literature on climate change is voluminous. For a brief description of the uncertainties surrounding global warming, see Philip H. Abelson, Uncertaintiesabout Global
Warming, 247 Science 1529 (Mar 30, 1990). For more excited accounts, see Dixy Lee Ray
with Lou Guzzo, Trashing the Planet: How Science Can Help Us Deal with Acid Rain,
Depletion of the Ozone, and Nuclear Waste (Among Other Things) 31 (Regnery Gateway,
1990) (concern with global warming is example of "environmental hysteria"); Dixy Lee
Ray with Lou Guzzo, Environmental Overkill: Whatever Happened to Common Sense? 1227 (Regnery Gateway, 1993); Ronald Bailey, Eco-Scam: False Prophets of Ecological
Apocalypse, 141-68 (St. Martin's, 1993).
' Committee on Science, Engineering, and Public Policy, National Academy of
Sciences, Policy Implications of Greenhouse Warming 76-78 (1991). For a contrary view,
see Herman E. Daly, EcologicalEconomics, 254 Science 358 (Oct 18, 1991).
$' At least one program that Breyer criticizes has been proposed as a means of
dealing with global warming. John H. Cushman, Jr., Clinton Wants to Strengthen Global
Pact on Air Pollution, NY Times A10 (Aug 16, 1994) (Clinton Administration urged to
strengthen automobile fuel-efficiency standards to combat global warming). This again
raises the possibility that Breyer's discussion will leave us with a regulatory
goal--combatting global warming-with no acceptable means of achieving it.
' On the risks of second-hand smoke, see Office of Health and Environmental Assessment and Office of Research and Development, Environmental Protection Agency,
Respiratory Health Effects of Passive Smoking: Lung Cancerand Other Disorders (1992).
For criticisms of EPA's report, see, for example, Richard Tomkins, US court win for
tobacco industry, Fin Times 3 (July 23-24, 1994); Robert J. Caldwell, Lost in the smoke
screen: bad science makes bad law, San Diego Union-Trib G-4 (May 22, 1994) (op-ed)
(comparing EPA's risk assessment for second-hand smoke with risk assessments for
asbestos, dioxin, and toxic waste).
36 This controversy is recounted in Hornstein, 92 Colum L Rev at 621-24 (cited in
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the latest studies on mammograms retract earlier advice about
how early and how often women should have mammograms. In
advocating increased funding for mammograms, Breyer relegates
such unfavorable studies to an endnote (p 95 n 91).
My purpose here is not to deny the dangers of climate
change and indoor air pollution, nor the benefits of vaccinations
and cancer screening. Rather, it is to suggest that if "a fairly
widespread view, within a knowledgeable community" (p 29), is
enough to doom some programs (like those regulating synthetic
chemicals), then it is enough to doom Breyer's favored programs
as well. Turn Breyer's book inside out, bring the "but see" citations to text, drop the points in text to the notes, and one has the
same experts and the same studies-but the opposite policy conclusions.
Another aspect of Breyer's proposal that seems arbitrary in
light of his overall theme is his willingness to continue spending
the same amount of money we now spend on health, safety, and
environmental regulation. Given that the overriding message of
Justice Breyer's book is that much current risk regulation is
crazy, it would seem to follow that the current level of spending
is not the appropriate one for a reformed system. If current regulation of risk is often random and excessive, this might suggest
that expenditures are also random and excessive. On the other
hand, if current risk regulation is as ineffective as Justice Breyer
implies, then it would not be surprising to find that current
spending is lower than it would be if regulation were more effective. One is usually willing to pay more for a better product. So,
if one shares Breyer's negative views regarding current risk regulation, there is no reason to believe that the current level of
spending is the appropriate level.
Perhaps Justice Breyer concluded that to allow his new corps
of civil servants-insulated from both the political process and, it
appears, judicial review-not only to decide how money will be
spent, but to decide how much money will be spent, would be too
dramatic an incursion on representative democracy. But then one

note 8) (describing trade-off between 1 in 310,000 danger of permanent brain damage
from whooping cough vaccine and danger of many more potentially fatal whooping cough
cases). See also Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk
Management in the Courts, 85 Colum L Rev 277, 285-90 (1985).
' See, for example, John Schwartz, Childhood Vaccines Rarely Cause Serious Complications, Panel Reports, Wash Post A20 (Sept 15, 1993) (discussing the possible, although rare, adverse reactions to childhood vaccines); Louise Palmer, Government Can't
Meet Vaccine Injury Claims, NY Times 6CN (Apr 25, 1993).
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must ask why one kind of randomness justifies overriding democratic processes, and another kind does not.
In any event, despite Breyer's protestations to the contrary,
it is extremely likely that, in practice, Breyer's reformed system
would lead to much lower overall expenditures on health, safety,
and the environment. Raising the threshold for government regulation in the ways that Breyer suggests-such as discarding the
default assumptions (such as linear dose-response models) used
to assess risk in conditions of uncertainty; establishing a de minimis level of risk below which no regulation would occur; and
setting a maximum level of expenditure per life saved-would
almost certainly mean less regulation, and therefore lower spending.
Regardless of whether the amount of money spent in
Breyer's reformed system were more, less, or the same as the
amount we now spend, the money still would have to come from
somewhere. Here is where Breyer's scheme is perhaps most perplexing. He proposes the money be diverted from the old programs to the new; as noted, he suggests that money now spent
on hazardous waste cleanup might, for example, be used to fund
vaccination programs. However, if the risks posed by hazardous
waste sites have been as exaggerated as Breyer suggests, then it
is not at all clear that the owners and operators of such sites
should continue to bear the same cost burden in a reformed system. If one believes, with Breyer, that the amount now spent on
hazardous waste cleanup is excessive, then one would want to
look elsewhere for funding for new programs.
Occasional passages in Breyer's book hint that instead of
obtaining money for health protection through hazardous waste
litigation, we might tax the producers of low-level carcinogens
and use the proceeds for health programs (pp 28, 67). This does
not solve the problem noted above. If the risks of low-level carcinogens are as minimal and uncertain as Breyer implies, it is not
obvious why their producers should fund the new regulatory system through increased taxes. Nor is it clear why-if PCBs are indeed as harmless as raw mushrooms-PCBs, but not mushrooms,
should be taxed. Yet this is what Breyer implies when, for natural carcinogens, he proposes merely "encouraging changes in diet"
(p 23).
There is, in sum, a mismatch between Breyer's critique of
current risk regulation and his substantive proposals for reform.
Indeed, measured against the standards he applies to current
regulation, Breyer's regulatory agenda appears random, too.
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Breyer wants new regulatory programs to replace the old, but the
new ones are open to the same kinds of attacks that he has made
against the old. He is willing to spend the same amount of money
in the new world as in the old, yet that amount derives from the
system he wants us to discard. He proposes taxing some health
risks and not others, yet the basis on which he decides which
risks to tax seems to be the same irrational distinctions he elsewhere criticizes.
Since Breyer's substantive proposals for reform do not follow
from his critique of current regulation, one may easily accept the
first part of his thesis-that some programs ought to be curtailed
or even discarded-while simultaneously rejecting the second
part-that the old programs should be replaced with new ones.
Thus, despite Breyer's contrary wishes, Breaking the Vicious
Circle could in fact serve as a blueprint for deregulation.
IV.

INCONSISTENCY

Breaking the Vicious Circle calls for comprehensive evaluation of regulatory options, and for the selection of the option that
saves the greatest number of human lives at the current level of
spending. The trouble with the current system, Breyer believes,
is that the public's irrational perceptions of risk distract it from
the goal of more lives saved, and therefore the way to save more
lives is to cut the public out of the decision-making process. In
short, Breyer wants science, not politics, to guide our decisions
about risk, and he wants the goal of those decisions to be onedimensional: more human lives saved.
But where does the goal of more-human-lives-saved come
from? It doesn't come from science. Out of all of the possible
objectives of health, safety, and environmental regulation-saving human lives, preventing adverse health consequences short of death, preserving ecosystems and species,
spreading the risks of industrialization more equally throughout
the population, saving wild places-Breyer has chosen only one,
saving human life, and labelled that the proper goal of risk regulation. Call it what you will, this is not a "scientific" choice.
Breyer's project is thus infused from the start with the non-science he wants to avoid.
Breyer's fixation on more-human-lives-saved ignores more
than other kinds of physical risk, such as threats to other living
things. It also disregards contextual differences such as, for example, the voluntariness of the risk, its effect on future generations, and its distribution in the population. Breyer tries to justi-
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fy his narrow choice of goals by appealing to what he takes to be
the public's "true" preferences:
A typical member of the public would like to minimize risks
of death to himself, to his family, to his neighbors; he would
normally prefer that regulation buy more safety for a given
expenditure or the same amount of safety for less. Not many
of us would like to shift resources to increase overall risks of
death significantly in order to increase the likelihood that
death will occur on a bicycle or in a fire, rather than through
disease (pp 33-35).
Thus Breyer dismisses decades of research indicating that
laypeople's conception of "risk" is richer than one that views risk
solely in terms of mortality." In characterizing the "dread" associated with a risk, people also care about such things as whether
the risk has immediate or latent effects; whether it will affect
future generations; and whether its effects are catastrophic or
diffuse. 9 Regardless whether these values fit within some narrow conception of "rationality,"' they surely are legitimate
grounds for democratic decision making. As noted, Breyer tries to
skirt the democratic objection by suggesting that people do not
really care very much about these things; once this maneuver
fails, the objection from democracy goes unmet.4 1 Thus, Breyer
can appeal neither to science nor to people's preferences to justify
his decision to abstract from every regulatory goal other than
saving as many human lives as possible.
Yet I wonder whether Breyer himself wholeheartedly embraces this one-dimensional approach to risk. If the only aim of
risk regulation were truly to save more lives, this would mean
that it would not matter whether the people saved were at the

'

For an oft-cited review of the literature, see Slovic, 236 Science 280 (cited in note

8).
" For a study using regression techniques to identify the major explanatory variables
for the risk perceptions reported by laypeople in a series of classic studies, see Robin
Gregory and Robert Mendelsohn, Perceived Risk, Dread, and Benefits, 13 Risk Analysis
259 (1993).
' For an argument that such values are "rational," and ought to be considered in regulating risk, see Richard H. Pildes and Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory
State, 62 U Chi L Rev 1 (1995).
41 Justice Breyer also implies that people's risk perceptions are a product of ignorance (p 35). He fails to mention, however, that when people are asked questions about
what he might regard as "actual" risk-how many people are killed in a given year by
activity X?-their answers resemble those of the experts. See Slovic, 236 Science at 283

(cited in note 8).
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beginning or the end of their lives; whether untold human suffering short of death could be alleviated with the same amount of
resources used to save one life; or whether every inch of wild
space were giving way while we chased an elusive immortality. It
would also mean that we would make no distinction between
risks voluntarily and involuntarily imposed. So why not, for example, ban smoking? Smoking kills 400,000 Americans every
year.' Even if a ban prevented only 10 percent of those deaths,
it would, by Breyer's count, prevent at least as many deaths as
are prevented by all of our health, safety, and environmental programs put together (pp 6-7). Yet the only regulatory measure
Breyer suggests with respect to smoking is to "advertis[e] the
cancer-causing potential of... indoor smoke" (p 23). Why such a
tepid response to perhaps the biggest killer in our society, if
saving lives is our only goal?
One suspects that, in offering suggestions for new regulatory
programs, Breyer has smuggled in the politics that he purports to
dismiss. To have a preference for informational campaigns over
outright bans, one ordinarily needs something more than a preference for saving more lives-one also needs a political theory
that prefers private ordering over government regulation and
market "incentives" over coercive orders.43 This is Breyer's political theory," and it-as much as the preference for saving
human lives-explains why he prefers "paying for early cancer
screenings and patients' travel to central cancer hospitals" (p 28)
over the regulation of things that make people sick.
All this leads to an obvious point. If Breyer gets to keep his
politics, then why doesn't everyone else?

V.

BREAKING THE Vicious CIRCLE

This is not a new story. The history of American administrative law is riddled with failed attempts to resolve the tension between "science" and "politics." Sometimes we have tried to resolve
the dilemma by cutting off one side of it. The New Deal faith in
See, for example, Philip J. Hilts, Is Nicotine Addictive? It Depends on Whose Criteria You Use, NY Times C3 (Aug 2, 1994).
' It is possible that in some cases an informational campaign could be as effective in
saving lives as an outright ban. But then one would still need something other than the
goal of saving lives to choose between the two regulatory methods. In any event, Justice
Breyer argues that informational campaigns are unlikely to be effective in educating
people about risk (pp 38-39). Thus it remains a mystery why so many of the programs he
recommends are informational campaigns (pp 23, 28).
See Breyer, Regulation and Its Reform at 15-35 (cited in note 2).
42
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the neutral expert ignored the political dimension of science,
while regulatory negotiation seems to discount science's contribution to politics.45 More often we have addressed the dilemma by
making room for both sides of it. Thus, in an agency rule-making
proceeding on nuclear waste, we may see the comments of nuclear physicists filed side by side with the comments of schoolchildren.
Yet it is not clear what the schoolchildren are to say to the
nuclear physicists. That they are afraid? That they would rather
the waste went somewhere else? The kinds of things that they
might say are the kinds of things that have brought charges of
ignorance, "nimbyism," and foolishness. A large task for those
interested in regulatory reform is to make room for meaningful
citizen involvement without sacrificing the benefits of science.4"
For too long, we have alternated between the scientific and political models of regulatory decision making, without making any
serious effort to harmonize them. This, rather than the political
cycle Breyer identifies, is the vicious circle that needs to be broken.

4' For a critical analysis of regulatory negotiation, see Susan Rose-Ackerman, Consensus Versus Incentives: A Skeptical Look at Regulatory Negotiation, 43 Duke L J 1206
(1994).
" For a preliminary effort along these lines, see Pildes and Sunstein, 62 U Chi L Rev
1 (cited in note 40).

